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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No. 7862

LEO MILLS,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Leo Mills, defendant and appellant herein, was charged
with the crime of carnal knowledge. His trial was had before
a judge and jury in the Third District Court. By a unanimous
verdict the jury found defendant guilty as charged, and judgment was entered by the court accordingly.
Appellant attacks the verdict as being contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. He avers the jury disregarded the
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Court's instructions numbers five, six and nine. He further
alleges that the verdict was the result of passion and prejudice.
The prosecutrix at the- time of the· offense in question
was a girl seventeen years of age. (Tr. 41). She testified that
on the night of October 29th, 1951, defendant took her, in his
car, to a place near the eastern terminus of 21st South Street,
in Salt Lake City, where "he made me take off my pants and
get in the back seat of the car." (Tr. 51). Defendant at this
time had sexual intercourse with prosecutrix, rupturing the
hymen. (Tr. 46-53, 53-56).

S:r'ATEMENT.OF POINTS
I.

THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
VERDICT.

II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE JURY DISREGARDED THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS.

Ill.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE VERDICT IS
:')BASED ON PASSION AND PREJUDICE.
4
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE
VERDICT.
Appellant attacks the verdict as being contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. In State v. Montgomery, 37 Utah
515, 109 P 815, a case where a conviction of carnal knowledge
was upheld, the court at page 816, said:

* * * Concerning the contention that the judgment is not sustained by sufficient evidence, it is sufficient to say that the evidence with regard to the sexual
act is in direct conflict. The prosecutrix most emphatically stated in her testimony that the appellant, on or
about the 16th day of August, 1908, had sexual intercourse with her while she and he were out riding together in his buggy; that she never had sexual intercourse with any one else either before or after the act
in question, while appellant, upon the other hand, jusc
as emphatically denies such intercourse either on th~t
occasion or at any other time. There are some facts
in evidence which, to some extent, tend to corroborate
the prosecutrix, while the evidence in corroboration of
appellant's claims is much stronger. In view of the circumstances there is no escape from the conclusion that
neither the prosecutrix nor the appellant could be mistanke with regard to whether the sexual act took place
or not. They either had or did not have the sexual intercourse as testified to .by the prosecutrix. This, no doubt,
is the view the jury entertained, and thus concluded
that, under all the circumstances, the statements of the
prosecutrix were more worthy of belief than were those
of the appellant and his witnesses, none of whom,
j
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except the appellant, were present when the alleged
offense was committed.

* * *
* * * If there is substantial evidence in support of
the verdict, we are powerless to interfere with it, except
upon questions of law. This is the clear import of our
Constitution and has become the settled policy of this
court as appears from the following, * * * (Citing
Cases).
The evidence in the instant case is in direct conflict with
regard to the sexual act. Prosecutrix testified that defendant
had sexual intercourse with her. At page fifty-one of the record
she says:
A.

Well, after I got in the back seat he took off his
pants, and then got on top of me.

Q.

Did he have sexual intercourse with you at that
·time?

A.

Yes, I could feel something go in at that time, and
it hurt a lot.

The testimony of Dr. Joseph R. Evans, corroborates prosecutrix as to the fact of copulation. (Tr. 55).

1

I

MR. OLIVER: Yes, I will stipulate to the testimony
of the doctor.
·~·

\
'

11

1

r\l

MR. TUFT: May it be stipulated Dr. Joseph R. Evans,
a medical doctor, with offices and his practice in
Salt Lake City - if he were called on behalf of
the State he would testify that on the morning of
October 30, 1951, he performed an examination
of the person of [prosecutrix], at his office; that on
said examination he found that there had been a
6
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rupture of the hymen; that there was an inflamation of the cervix; and that he found both in the
interior and exterior of her body substances which
appeared to him to be at that time male spermatozoa; that he took from the body of (prosecutrix]
samples of said specimens and submitted them to
a laboratory for examination; that the laboratory
report returned to him showed that in truth and
fact the said substances were male spermatozoa;
that from his examination he concluded that the
said [prosecutrix] had engaged in an act of sexual
intercourse.
Prosecutrix also positively identified defendant as the man
who had sexual intercourse with her on the night in question.
(Tr. 47-52).
Defendant testified that he did not have sexual intercourse with prosecutrix on the night in question, nor had ever
had intercourse with prosecutrix. (Tr. 74).
Appellant testified that he was at home the night of the
offense, and that he left for California on a vacation early in
the morning of the next day. (Tr. 63-71). This story, appellant claims is corroborated by the testimony of Mrs. Mills, his
wife. She testified that she was home with defendant the
night of the offense and that he left for California about four
o'clock the morning of October 30, 1951. (Tr. 59-63). With
reference to the testimony of Mrs. Mills, the court's attentio~
is invited to that of Officer Jackson, who went twice to the
home of defendant the same night Mrs. Mills says defendant
was at home. His testimony is as follows: (Tr. 86, 87).
Q.

Are you testifying now you did go to the home of
the defendant?
7
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A.

I testify 1 did go to the home· of the defendant.

Q.

At what time?

A.

It was a little after 2:00 dclock,

Q.

Did you gq in tl1e. home? .

A.

I went. to the door of the home.

Q.

Did you· make any observation as to the light or
darkness?

A.

The home was in darkness.

Q.

Did you have occasion to go back again to that
home on that evening?

.,!

,I'

-

A. I did.
Q.

At what time, Officer Jackson?

A.

It was about 3:00 o'clock.

Q.

And was anyone with you?

A.

Yes, the father of [prosecutrix].

Q.

Will you state what occured at the time you went
to the home the second time?

A.

The second time I went to the home, [the father of
prosecutrix J was with me. I got out of my car, the
police car, and went to the door and knocked, and
when I knocked quite vigorously- I had to knock
quite vigorously to wake up. the occupants; and
when I knocked at the door a little while later
came down to the door Mrs. Leo Mills in .an
apparel of a kjmona.

Q.

Did you have occasion to inquire as to the whereabouts of the defendant?

/
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A.

I asked Mrs. Mills where the defendant, Mr. Mills,
was at that time.

Q.
A.

Did you make known who you were?
Yes, Sir.

Q.

And what did she answer you?

A.

She said she was surprised to know where he was.
She didn't know where he had gone.

Defendant further relies on the: testimony of Henry Colding, ( T r. 82-8 5) , Bernard Gordon, ( T r:. 78-82) , and his son,
Marion Leon Mills, (Tr. 75-78), in attempting to establish
his presence at his own home the night of the offense. It is to
be noted that, excepting th testimony of the son, (Tr. 76), none
of this evidence establishes that it was the night of October
29th, 1951, that these witnesses saw defendant at his home.
(Tr. 81, 84).
From the evidence in this case, which was fully and fairly
presented to the jury, certainly, we can conclude that there is
substantial evidence upon which a jury would be justified in
finding a verdict of guilty.
Appellant cites three cases which, he claims, support his
contention, Bufford v. State, 25 Ala. A. 99, 141 So. 359; People
t'. Keller, 227 Mich. 520, 198 N.W. 939; Williams v. State,
61 Okla, Cr. Rep. 396, 68 P 2d 530. In the Bufford Case,
where a conviction for homicide was set aside, the court found
that the evidence was all circumstantial and that it was "so far
outweighed by the proven facts, probabilities, presumptions, and
indisputable exculpating circumstances - that we have reached
the solemn conclusion that the verdict ought not to be al9
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lowed to stand." In People v. Keller, a statutory rape case,
it appeared to the court that prosecutrix had an ulterior motive
for making the charge, that the truth of her story was rendered
improbable by facts which she admitted, and which were
fairly established by proof, and that prosecutrix had little regard
for or appreciation of an oath; therefore, they felt it their
duty to grant a new trial. The court in the Williams case
reversed a conviction of rape, because it found that practically
every witness for the state tended to corroborate the statement
made by the defendant.
It is respectfully submitted tht none of the grounds relied

on for reversal in the cases cited by appellant exist in the
instant case.

POINT II.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE JURY DISREGARDED THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS.
Instructions 5, 6 and 9, are stock instructions to the effect
that the testimony of prosecutrix should be weighed with care,
that the testimony of defendant should be weighed the same
as the testimony of any other witness, that passion and prejudice have no place in the deliberations of a jury, and that to
warrant conviction of defendant every reasonable hypothesis
other than that of the guilt of defendant must be excluded from
the minds of the jurymen.
Respondent respectfully submits there is no evidence that
the jury disregarded the above noted instructions, or any of the
10
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instructions submitted_ by the court. Appellant relies only upon
the evidence given by his own witnesses to sustain his claim.
This,. we think, we have shown to be insufficient to preclude
a jury from arriving at a verdict of guilty. Appellant has not
shown that the jury did not follow the mandate in these
instructions.

POINT III.
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE VERDICT IS
BASED ON PASSION AND PREJUDICE.
Appellant offers no more evidence in support of his Point
III, than that the prosecutrix is a White girl and defendant
is a Negro man. The record discloses that defendant was afforded a fair and impartial trial. Respondent submits that an
analysis of the transcript discloses that not only was there no
effort on the part of the prosecuting attorney to exploit this
racial difference, but that the judge was particularly attentive
to the rights of the one accused. Further, no expression of the
jury appears which could in any way indicate that its verdict
was the product of passion or prejudice. In t4e absence of any
appeal to racial prejudice, or to prejudice in any of its forms
there is no error. 3 Am. fur., Appeal and Error, § 1081 et seq.
The error alleged by appellant is not supported by the record.

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that an analysis of the
11
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record and proceedings in this case discloses ample evidence
upon which the verdict of the jury may rightfully rest, that the
conviction is proper and should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
RICHARD J. MAUGHAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
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